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Transaction Cost Economics, Labor Law, and 
the Gig Economy
Seth Oranburg and Liya Palagashvili
ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of technology not only is creating innovative goods and services, but it is 
also altering the workplace and the traditional understanding of relationships between em-
ployee and employer. This can be seen today with the rise of the gig economy and alternative 
work arrangements. Our paper seeks to explain how technology has reduced the transaction 
costs of contracting in the market. In particular, we identify the innovations that have led to 
reductions in triangulation, transfer, trust, and measurement costs. These costs are relevant for 
creating greater exchanges between consumers and labor suppliers and, hence, more work for 
contractors and freelancers. Innovations that reduce measurement costs also reduce the firm’s 
costs of outsourcing contract work relative to employing. We conclude with a discussion of the 
radical implications for labor law.
You will never get to perfection because transaction costs are al-
ways positive, but they can be reduced. (Epstein 2015a, p. 791)
1. INTRODUCTION
Richard Epstein’s scholarship connects a broad range of topics including 
law, economics, and society. In particular, Epstein has written extensively 
on labor regulations, with an emphasis on the virtues of contract-at-will 
employment. In his seminal work on the topic, he argued that parties 
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should be permitted as of right to adopt the contract-at-will form if they 
so desire because such freedom of contract advances both individual au-
tonomy and efficient operation of labor markets (Epstein 1984). Epstein’s 
earlier work laid the foundation for his defense of the contract at will by 
arguing that workers’ compensation should be the outgrowth of a volun-
tary arrangement (Epstein 1982).
Now we find ourselves in a period of rapid change in labor markets 
as the traditional relationship between employee and employer is being 
disrupted by technological advancements, and the relevance of these la-
bor laws are coming under scrutiny. Most notably, this change can be 
seen in the rise of the gig economy and the freelance movement. One 
estimate is that 15.8 percent of workers in the current labor force en-
gage in gig, contractor, or freelance work as their main source of income, 
which is a more than 50 percent increase of workers in alternative work 
arrangements as their main job from 2005 to 2015 (Katz and Krueger 
2016). Other measures indicate that there were 57.3 million freelancers 
in 2017—which means that close to 36 percent of the US labor force en-
gaged in freelancing, as either a main or side source of income (Edelman 
Intelligence 2017). When measuring the number of 1099-MISC (contrac-
tor) versus W-2 (employee) tax forms, Dourado and Koopman (2015) 
find that there has been a 22 percent increase in the use of 1099-MISC 
forms since 2000, and over that same period there was a decline of 3.5 
percent in W-2 form usage. Over the last few years, freelance work has 
grown three times more than the growth of the US workforce (Edelman 
Intelligence 2017). However one measures it, there seem to be unprece-
dented changes to the nature of work in the United States that appear to 
be accelerating.1 Why might this be happening? Can we expect it to con-
tinue? What does this mean for labor law?
To answer these questions, this paper draws on the transaction costs 
framework to understand how technological innovations have led to 
changes in transaction costs—in particular, reductions in triangulation, 
transfer, trust, and measurement costs. The fall in these transaction costs 
creates increased direct exchanges between consumers and labor suppli-
ers (hereafter, CLS exchanges) and hence more independent contractor 
types of work. Innovations that reduce measurement costs also reduce 
the firm’s costs of outsourcing contract work relative to employing. These 
factors can help explain the rise of freelancing, contracting, and gig work 
today. If technological changes continue to lower these transaction costs, 
1. For more on the growth of work for freelancers and contractors, see also Manyika 
et al. (2016) and MBO Partners (2017).
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there will be even greater growth in the number of contractors as CLS 
networks expand and firms rely less on indefinite long-term employment 
contracts for labor and instead substitute usage of the market. At the out-
set, we acknowledge that the various reductions in transaction costs that 
we identify in this paper are not the only factors leading to the transfor-
mation of work today.
Accordingly, the law needs to recognize that these formerly alterna-
tive forms of work may soon predominate in the labor market, and labor 
laws written in the 1930s may be outdated and inapplicable to the new 
type of jobs that are emerging today. It is time to revisit the Epsteinian 
insights on labor and discuss whether Epstein’s arguments for reforming 
labor law are more or less merited given technological change and the 
growth of the gig and freelance economy. In particular, laws based on 
hours worked may not be applicable to a new economy where input mea-
sures (hours worked) may no longer be the relevant units (Epstein 2019). 
Labor laws regarding health, retirement, and other benefits will also lose 
relevance as the employee-employer relationship dissipates, and a move 
toward a portable benefits regime may be the best solution.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the framework 
and identifies the specific transaction cost mechanisms relevant for our 
analysis. Section 3 applies the transaction costs framework to under-
standing the technological innovations related to the growth of gig and 
contracting work. Section 4 discusses what these workplace changes 
mean for labor and employment law, and Section 5 concludes.
2. THE TRANSACTION COSTS FRAMEWORK
Much of the literature on the study of alternative labor arrangements 
and firms’ decisions to contract out labor has focused on identifying the 
characteristics of firms that will predict a preference for contracting out 
or staffing up (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993; Kalleberg and Schmidt 1996; 
Uzzi and Barsness 1998). Other scholars have focused on the characteris-
tics of workers who prefer to be contractors instead of employees (Howe 
1986; Williams 1989; Cohen and Haberfeld 1993). Yet others have ex-
plored market conditions that could predict more or less long-term em-
ployment (Abraham and Taylor 1996; Weil 2014).
One important theoretical framework for the contracting versus em-
ploying decision has its underpinnings in the transaction costs econom-
ics literature, which has its beginnings in Ronald Coase’s seminal paper 
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“The Nature of the Firm” (Coase 1937). Transaction costs refer to all 
costs associated with carrying out an exchange, which includes the costs 
of originating, negotiating, consummating, monitoring, and enforcing a 
contract for any given exchange. Coase explains how positive transaction 
costs are responsible for the creation and growth of firms. This is because 
it may be less costly for firms to set up and create one contract (an em-
ployment contract) when a job has to be done repeatedly instead of creat-
ing an infinite series of potentially costly contracts in the market.2
In other words, transaction costs make the use of the market system 
somewhat costly for ongoing exchanges. From this, it follows that the 
higher the cost of transacting across markets, the greater the advantage of 
organizing within the firm. Or the corollary: as transaction costs decrease, 
there will be a tendency for greater use of the market system rather than 
the firm. Coase’s foundational work is ambiguous about the specifics of 
transaction costs, but subsequent scholars investigated their particulars, 
identifying concepts such as search, bargaining, and monitoring costs, 
among others (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Williamson 1981; Cheung 
1983; Grossman and Hart 1986; Holmström and Milgrom 1991).
The relevance of transaction costs for the gig economy is as follows: 
if technological advancements can reduce the costs of transacting outside 
the firm (in the market) rather than inside the firm, this cost reduction can 
help explain the rise of contractor work. Munger (2015, 2018) is one of 
the first to apply the transaction costs approach to one sector of the new 
economy, the sharing economy (such as Uber and Airbnb), and specifi-
cally on the product and service side. We extend Munger’s discussions to 
analyzing the labor market, and in doing so, we identify the mechanisms 
and types of transaction costs relevant for understanding the increase in 
contractor, freelance, and gig work. In the following sections, we explain 
how changes in the costs of triangulation, transfer, and trust impact di-
rect CLS transactions (referred to as a peer-to-peer relationship) and how 
changes in measurement costs impact the market between firms and labor 
suppliers, although these costs are generally applicable to both markets.3
2. Coase (1937, p. 391) explains that the owner “does not have to make a series of 
contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be 
necessary of course, if this cooperation were a direct result of the working of the price 
mechanism.”
3. Changes in triangulation, transfer, and trust costs are most clearly illustrated by 
peer-to-peer transactions, because they can be quite high in the sort of one-off exchanges 
that are now facilitated by technology platforms, although they likewise impact a firm’s 
decision to hire or contract out for services.
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2.1. Triangulation Costs
Triangulation costs are a category of transaction costs coined by Munger 
(2018) to encompass both search and information costs (Dahlam 1979) 
and bargaining costs (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Dahlam 1979). Search 
and information costs refer to costs in determining what is available on 
the market, including information about the ability and location of each 
counterparty. Bargaining costs are the costs of coming to an agreement 
between the parties. For example, when buying a home, the search costs 
are the costs associated with finding and determining the home’s condi-
tion. Bargaining costs are the costs of negotiating a price and the condi-
tions of the transaction with the seller. Munger groups these two cate-
gories of search and information costs and bargaining into one, calling 
it triangulation costs. We follow suit to simplify the discussion. Taken 
together, triangulation costs include the costs of finding the counterparty 
and agreeing to the terms of the transaction.4
We provide an illustration of how triangulation costs are relevant for 
peer-to-peer exchanges: person A wants to have a painting hung in his or 
her apartment, but the costs of finding person B, who is nearby and will-
ing to hang the painting and has the ability to do so, and then negotiating 
the terms of agreement may be too high. If triangulation costs are too 
high, the exchange may not occur. In general, if the cost of discovering 
buyers and suppliers of a particular service and coming to an agreement 
for each transaction is high, then there will be fewer opportunities for 
exchange and thus fewer peer-to-peer transactions. Thus, our hypothesis 
incorporating technological change is as follows: if technology can reduce 
the costs of both discovering one another and coming to an agreement, 
then there will be more peer-to-peer transactions, and thus more con-
tracting of labor, in which a consumer directly pays a labor supplier for 
providing a particular good or service.
2.2. Transfer Costs
Transfer costs are the costs of “transferring payment and goods that [are] 
immediate and as invisible as possible” (Munger 2018, p. 9). Where tri-
angulation costs refer to the ability to get information about each party 
and to come to an agreement, transfer costs refer to the ability to process 
payments and to physically provide the good or service. This includes 
4. We follow the use of Munger’s triangulation costs to simplify the discussion, but 
the conclusion would be the same even if these costs were analyzed separately.
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handling and storage costs, direct transport costs, costs of money trans-
fer or verification processes, and the legal constraints that further impact 
the transfer of payments and goods and services. For example, person A 
knows that person B is willing and able to provide the service of hanging 
the painting, but person B does not have the ability to receive credit card 
payments. If person A has only a credit card, they may not be able to 
transact, because transfer costs are too high. Similarly, if person B needs 
to employ costly transport to perform this service, that increases transfer 
costs, and again the parties will not transact if such costs are too high. In 
general, transfer costs rise inversely to the ease of transfer of payments 
and goods or services, so if the process of providing the goods or services 
and paying for them is less costly, then there will be more peer-to-peer 
contracting.
2.3. Trust Costs
Even if person A and person B are easily able to find each other and come 
to an agreement for hanging a painting, and they have few problems with 
transferring the service and the payment, there may still be significant 
concerns with having a stranger visit one’s home or with the quality of 
the service rendered. These are trust costs, and if they are too high, then 
the peer-to-peer transaction may not occur. Trust refers to the ability to 
outsource “assurance of honesty and performance” (Munger 2018, p. 9). 
Person A could find out whether person B is skilled in hanging a painting 
and can be trusted to enter his or her home, but it could involve a costly 
process of calling neighbors, finding someone who might know someone 
who might know person B, and so forth. Person B might likewise be con-
cerned that person A will fail to make the payment once services are ren-
dered. When assuring trust is costly, parties may decide not to exchange. 
But if trust becomes easier to assess with less costly information, then 
parties to a transaction will be more likely to exchange, thus expanding 
opportunities for buyers and sellers to contract with each other. In other 
words, if the costs of finding that each party can be trusted are lower, this 
further increases peer-to-peer transactions.
2.4. Measurement Costs
Important to the firm’s decision to hire or contract is the ability of em-
ployers to measure the performance of the worker or the output he or 
she produces. These are measurement costs, and they can be higher when 
multiple workers are engaged in a single project. Alchian and Demsetz 
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(1972) discuss the theory of team production and explain how firms solve 
the difficulty of ascertaining individual contributions. Cheung (1983) ex-
plains that since some components of a particular good or service are 
assembled in a way that makes the separation of workers’ contributions 
costly, firms hire employees.
In other words, if an individual worker’s contributions are perfectly 
definable and measureable, then firms could directly buy his or her out-
put in the marketplace. But many outputs require joint or team produc-
tion, in which it is difficult to ascertain individual contributions. In these 
cases, it is easier to employ workers and measure and monitor individual 
inputs (for example, hours worked) as a proxy for outputs. For example, 
it is easier to commission a writer to produce a screenplay or a manu-
script than it is to contract separately with many lawyers to structure an 
acquisition. Screenwriting is an individual task, so a firm can simply pay 
a screenwriter for a finished product. Structuring an acquisition requires 
many workers’ efforts because it may require several thousand person- 
hours of work to be completed in a few weeks’ time, and it is hard to 
correlate an individual lawyer’s effort with a successful result, so the ac-
quirer will hire a law firm, and the firm will monitor the workers’ inputs 
(for example, billable hours).
Thus, when measurement costs are lower, firms will tend to contract 
out rather than staff up (employ). If technology can lead to the perfor-
mance of individual workers being more definable and measureable, then 
firms are more likely to contract out the labor than to hire an employee. 
Williamson (1981, p. 564) similarly refers to this type of transaction cost 
but calls it “the ease with which the productivity of human assets can be 
evaluated.”5
3. APPLICATION TO THE GIG ECONOMY
Before we begin to apply the mechanisms and specific transaction costs 
to understanding the labor market side and the gig economy, we provide 
a description of how the sale of goods and services and the type of trans-
5. In the transaction costs literature, monitoring costs are a type of transaction cost 
that, if decreased, would lead to greater usage of contract labor. It is important to note, 
however, that if technology reduces the input-monitoring costs, this can lead to greater 
usage of employees rather than contractors, given other factors for why the firms are re-
lying on the proxy measure of inputs rather than outputs. Cheung (1983) elaborates on 
this analysis.
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actions have changed with new technologies. Such changes have created 
new sets of economic activities, for example, the sharing economy and 
the on-demand economy.
3.1. Descriptions of New Economies
To contrast the new economies, consider how goods are created in a tra-
ditional manufacturing economy. For a car, first, coal and ore are mined 
and smelted to make steel. The steel has more value than the coal and ore 
did in the ground. Second, the steel is transported to an automotive fac-
tory, where it has more value as a car door panel. Third, the door panel 
is incorporated with inputs from other upstream producers such as glass 
windshields and electronic components to create a functional car. A com-
pleted car that can drive is worth more than the sum of its static parts. 
Fourth, the finished product (the new car) is transported from a central-
ized manufacturing facility in, say, Indiana, to retail auto dealers all over 
America, where it is more convenient for prospective buyers to test and 
acquire it. Fifth, salespeople at the dealerships inform buyers about the 
car’s features, help them secure financing, and teach them to use the tech-
nical features of the vehicle. Sixth, independent aftermarket maintenance 
and repair service providers help keep the car running. Each step in this 
process, which can be visualized as a river on which inputs flow from up-
stream supply to downstream sales, adds value to the product.
In contrast, the sharing economy is based on resource reallocation. 
The resources that were extracted and sold in the traditional economy 
may be underutilized. For example, consider a vacant home. The home 
is built from materials extracted via the traditional economy. It is sold to 
someone who later no longer has as much use for it, but it is not a good 
candidate for resale because of tax or other reasons. The vacant home is 
an underutilized asset. The sharing economy provides technological solu-
tions to make better use of this asset: the Airbnb platform connects indi-
viduals who have vacant homes with individuals who will pay to stay in 
them.
Cars are also underutilized assets when they sit in driveways and park-
ing garages. GetAround is a peer-to-peer car-sharing platform in which 
individuals borrow an idle car, and car owners place a piece of technol-
ogy on their car that tracks its location and locks and unlocks it. With 
the tap of an app, owners can indicate when they want to make their 
car available or when they are taking it off the market. A borrower uses 
the app to find available cars and unlocks them. When the borrower is 
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finished, the app finds a new parking spot for the car, under a set of con-
ditions for how far the owner would like it to be from the original loca-
tion. The platform also processes payments and insurance information 
and provides users’ ratings.
These are examples of the on-demand economy, a digital market-
place that matches consumers’ wants with providers to immediately de-
liver those goods and services.6 It includes companies such as InstaCart, 
Handy, and Postmates; these platforms connect buyers and sellers to all 
types of goods and services to be rendered on demand. Typically, on- 
demand economies utilize contract work precisely because the on-demand 
business models necessitate a flexible labor supply (Palagashvili 2017).
A decade ago, these types of exchanges would have been too costly 
to facilitate, and it would have been easier to buy or rent a car in the 
traditional manner. But with new technologies—especially Web platform 
technology—peer-to-peer bike sharing, clothes sharing, and a host of 
other assets are now proliferating in the market.
3.2. Transaction Costs and the Gig Economy
As technology is reducing transaction costs and allowing for the emer-
gence of the sharing economy, peer-to-peer networks, and on-demand 
goods and services, it is also altering labor markets. Epstein recognized 
that this is precisely how the gig economy platforms work: “The network 
is live, and thus able to make instantaneous adjustments in price to reflect 
changes in supply and demand. The apps are easy to use, and sign-up is 
costless” (Epstein 2015a). This remarkable reduction in transaction costs 
has sweeping implications for labor and its regulation.
With the reduction in transaction costs, it is becoming more common 
for firms to rent workers rather than create long-term contracts with 
them (in a sense, to buy them). Meanwhile, consumers are increasingly 
buying labor directly—via Web platforms—thus leading to the emergence 
of the gig economy. For example, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a 
Web platform that operates “a crowdsourcing marketplace that makes it 
easier for individuals and businesses to outsource the processes and jobs 
to a distributed workforce who can perform these tasks virtually.”7 The 
MTurk platform facilitates posting job ads and offering services, which 
makes it easier and cheaper for buyers and sellers of labor to find each 
6. The on-demand economy is defined as the “economic activity created by technol-
ogy of other companies or providers that fulfill consumer demand via the immediate and 
flexible provisioning of goods and services” (International Bar Association 2011, p. 6). 
7. Amazon Mechanical Turk, Overview (https://www.mturk.com).
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other. Amazon supports MTurk with a highly advanced Web payment 
system, and it incorporates a robust bilateral rating system that informs 
people about the trustworthiness of market participants. In general, per-
formance of work via MTurk is cheap to observe: for example, a worker 
might be paid $1 to watch a 1-minute video and write the first five words 
that come to mind. It is easy to determine whether the video was played 
and words were entered.
While the tasks currently performed on MTurk are generally mun-
dane, they may become more complex as technology continues to reduce 
transaction costs of contracting in the market. In Oranburg and Pala-
gashvili (2020), we point to how blockchain technology and smart con-
tracts can further reduce transaction costs and can lead to further dissipa-
tion of the employee-employer relationship. Munger predicts this as well; 
as technology continues to reduce transaction costs, “the very notion of 
a firm may start to be eroded. A group of people, each of whom has de-
veloped a set of specialized skills and a reputation based on ratings on 
software such as LinkedIn, would be hired for a project” (Munger 2015, 
p. 206).
3.2.1. Triangulation Costs in the Gig Economy. Thanks to the Internet 
and specific software platforms and agreements, the costs of discovering 
buyers and sellers have become so low that it has enabled opportunities 
for suppliers of labor to directly contract with consumers. This reduction 
in triangulation costs not only facilitates the peer-to-peer economy per-
spective; it also in some cases diminishes the necessity of firms. Platform 
technology has driven down triangulation costs, making a broader range 
of work suitable for contracting arrangements.
Software used on these platforms includes such features as advanced 
global positioning systems (GPS) techniques to easily locate consumers 
who want a particular service with suppliers who are willing to provide 
it. The software also allows for users to easily indicate preferences, in-
cluding the willingness to buy and/or sell at particular price points, which 
thus enables the algorithm to instantly find a match between two parties. 
Quick and simple search functions, internal messaging systems, and dash-
boards to keep track of interested parties significantly increase the ability 
and reduce the cost to search and find a particular buyer or seller. In this 
way, the technology reduces search costs and thus the ability for two par-
ties to find and match with one another.
Furthermore, the platform is a formal channel for standard provision 
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of services. Contracting costs are reduced as terms are essentially crowd-
sourced from the feedback of millions of platform users, so that users 
converge to a focal contract based on reasonable expectations. Further-
more, in some cases, such as with Uber, the price is set by the platform, 
and that further reduces the bargaining costs, which could be significantly 
high if a user incurred them every time he or she took an Uber ride.
3.2.2. Transfer Costs in the Gig Economy. With the innovations in credit 
cards, online payment systems such as Paypal and Venmo, and payment 
verification technologies, the transfer costs of payment have fallen. This 
allows for companies to hold funds in escrow. In the case of Uber, the 
platform holds the rider’s payment in escrow for the driver until the ride 
is completed, and the funds are automatically released when the desti-
nation is reached. Drivers no longer have to worry that a rider will have 
insufficient funds to pay when the ride is over.
Furthermore, the transfer of physical goods or services is made easier 
with location tracking and GPS technologies that can reduce the costs of 
moving the particular good or service. For example, the process of re-
ceiving and providing a ride on Uber is simple: riders do not need to give 
directions to drivers to pick them up or to drop them off at their desig-
nated locations. The software provides everything and includes informa-
tion about traffic or construction problems that may get in the way of de-
livering the service of a ride. These new technologies reduce the transfer 
costs, thus allowing more exchanges between consumers and suppliers of 
the service, hence the emergence of gig economy work.
3.2.3. Trust Costs in the Gig Economy. Gig economy platforms employ 
rating and review systems that make it much easier to learn about the 
honesty and probable performance of a potential counterparty via infor-
mation on the Internet. Depending on the software, there are personal 
profiles of users where one can observe relevant information that is a 
proxy for trust. Information about both buyers and suppliers is crowd-
sourced and up-to-date, which means that if a particular driver is rated 
poorly at any given moment, that rating is automatically updated on the 
driver’s profile. Drivers can also rate riders, so if a rider harasses a driver, 
that information is added to the rider’s profile. This robust two-way 
rating system employed by most gig economy platforms provides valu-
able trust information that would be unavailable or too costly in a tra-
ditional economy, where phone calls or personal knowledge is needed to 
ensure trust. Thus, with this technology, both parties have better infor-
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mation about the counterparty before they agree to the transaction. In 
the example discussed above, in which person A would like a stranger to 
come into his or her home to hang a painting, TaskRabbit, the platform 
that enables this type of transaction, utilizes software to provide vetting 
and rating systems for both buyers and suppliers. Thus, new technology 
reduces the problem of trust, allowing for greater CLS transactions and 
hence more gig type of work.
3.2.4. Measurement Costs in the Gig Economy. Technology enables the 
creation of discrete outputs that can be separated into individual contri-
butions and hence reduces the problem of measurement costs faced by 
employers. Innovations in software for automated surveys, aggregation 
of reviews, and big data also provide low-cost methods of measuring, 
thus allowing workers to be compensated directly for their performance. 
This can be best illustrated by innovations in software developing, which 
is the largest process that firms have outsourced in the form of contractor 
labor.
High-level decomposition of a software design technique called mod-
ular programming, in which code is written in a set of discrete, indepen-
dent, interchangeable modules, allows for the separation of individual 
contributions. Each module contains everything necessary to perform just 
one aspect of the overall program’s function. This is distinguishable from 
a monolithic application in terms of both code structure and industrial 
organization. With modular programming, no one person or team is re-
sponsible for creating the whole program. Instead, the program is broken 
down into discrete projects. Each project can be completed by a small 
team or even one person. The success or failure of each project can be 
easily evaluated by determining whether the module performs its discrete 
function. In other words, because of modular programming, software 
coding is much less of a team production exercise. Instead of the entire 
code either functioning or not (which would make it hard to determine 
which programmer broke the code), modules—the output—can easily be 
measured and attributed to individual efforts.
4. CONSIDERATIONS FOR LABOR LAW
Does the emergence of the gig and freelance economy have radical impli-
cations for labor law? Labor law is predicated on people working as em-
ployees. But the rise of platform technology that facilitates people work-
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ing together flexibly in independent-contractor arrangements challenges 
the relevance of labor law as currently defined. The nature of the firm 
as first articulated by Coase and built on by other scholars predicts that 
reductions in the transaction costs identified in this paper will lead to 
greater utilization of market arrangements for labor (that is, contract-
ing out). We discussed the specific technologies that are leading to the 
reduction of those transaction costs and the theoretical reason why the 
technologies are creating more contract work and decentralizing labor 
markets. These factors, according to Coase, will result in a shrinking of 
the firm and more contracting on the market for labor. This means fewer 
employees and more independent contractors. And that, in turn, means 
fewer firms and people who are subject to labor law.
Although we predict an expansion of the labor contract at will in this 
new economy, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1935 and other labor 
laws and regulations do not accommodate a world in which most work-
ers are legally defined as independent contractors. In fact, those laws have 
the perverse effect of discouraging employers from hiring employees and 
encouraging them to instead use contract labor. This issue is especially 
pressing now that gig economy workers such as Uber drivers, who con-
tractually agreed to be classified as independent contractors at the incep-
tion of their work arrangement, are suing to retroactively be classified as 
employees and to receive employment benefits. A judicial fiat against the 
use of independent contractors thus threatens to destroy the labor inno-
vation that is the gig economy. As Epstein claims, “Now that labor mar-
kets are extensively regulated, the private evolution [of the relationship 
between employees and employers] has been brought to a halt” (Epstein 
2015b). If courts cast doubt on the enforceability of independent contrac-
tor and at-will work agreements, the entire gig economy could disappear.
Moreover, in addition to the general distortions to labor markets 
caused by labor regulation, some of these labor laws, such as minimum- 
wage laws and overtime regulations, may not even be applicable to 
a new economy in which input measures (for example, hours worked) 
are no longer the units for payment. Epstein (2019) discusses how re-
cent minimum- pay laws in New York City impacting for-hire vehicle 
drivers are causing challenges for gig economy ride-sharing workers who 
drive with multiple platforms at any given hour; such workers receive 
pay per ride rather than per hour to better align incentives for shorter 
trips. Moreover, hourly pay arrangements misalign incentives, as Epstein 
(2018, p. 51) argues: “The only possible chance of making this scheme 
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work for people who work for a single company is to work exclusively 
off the time reported for each, which of course gives drivers a perverse in-
centive to slow down their trips.” Since the nature of the gig economy of-
ten involves per-output rather than per-hour pay (for reasons that also in-
clude working with multiple platforms in any given hour), Epstein (2018, 
p. 51) rightfully argues that “[t]he difficulty of converting piece rate into 
hourly wage is a thousand times more difficult in this context than it is on 
the factory floor.”
Harris and Krueger (2015) also discuss this problem of immeasur-
ability of work hours, as many freelance and gig workers do not have 
standard work hours and the boundary between work and nonwork has 
dissolved. In some sense, these jobs look more like those of academics 
(with no real boundaries between work and nonwork) than of manufac-
turing workers clocking in for a clear 9–5 pm work shift, which makes it 
even more difficult to apply traditional overtime-pay regulations. Harris 
and Krueger also point to further challenges for labor regulations of “for 
whom?” work, since freelancers and contractors already work for many 
different institutions and individuals simultaneously. In their proposal 
for reforming labor laws for gig economy workers, Harris and Krueger 
(similar to Epstein) argue that it makes little sense to apply hour-based 
rules such as the minimum-wage and overtime regulations to contractors, 
freelancers, and gig economy workers. In theory, though, minimum-wage 
regulations could be updated as minimum price per output that work-
ers could be forced to charge. However, this would be counterproductive 
for the new economy because it would interfere with the process of how 
underutilized resources have become increasingly utilized in the gig econ-
omy. In the above example of GetAround, if regulations required that 
all car owners charge above a certain price, then many of them will be 
priced out of the market, and their cars will continue to sit idly in their 
driveways.
As more workers and employers effectively opt out of labor law by 
engaging in alternative work arrangements, the force of labor law does 
seem to be coming to an end. The efforts thus far to force workers and 
employers to be in an employment relationship and to retroactively re-
categorize independent contractors as employees has resulted in turmoil 
in the courts and the markets, but little good has come from trying to 
force the square peg of how people work today into the round hole of 
1930s-era labor law (Palagashvili 2017). Efforts to apply hours-based la-
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bor regulations to contractor-type work, which is often based on pay per 
output, can create further problems for the new economy.
Instead, there should be radical reforms to labor law that focus on 
developing a regime that works for the workers who are voluntarily de-
ciding to participate in this new economy. This requires divorcing the 
benefits that workers receive from employment from any one employer. 
Presently, many if not all of the benefits associated with work are tied 
to a specific employer. This can be problematic as more work becomes 
contract-based and the legal structure continues to encourage employer- 
provided benefits; more workers may be faced with less health insurance 
coverage and fewer other employment benefits. Labor regulations need 
to move toward allowing and encouraging portable benefits plans. The 
move toward a portable benefits solution will be facilitated if employ-
ment benefits are unbundled (Oranburg 2018). Presently, employment 
comes with a rigid bundle of benefits—including health insurance, life 
insurance, disability insurance, personal days, sick days, retirement plan 
contributions, and more—which are expensive and redundant when a 
worker has multiple jobs. As more workers turn to gig work on mul-
tiple platforms, flexible and portable employment benefit packages will 
become necessary.
Interestingly, private portable benefits are already beginning to appear 
among retirement benefits. Companies such as Honest Dollar are provid-
ing competitive individualized 401(k) benefits plans to contractors and 
freelancers. This evidences some market demand for the legal change that 
we recommend.
We have suggested a flexible approach to labor unions (Oranburg and 
Palagashvili 2020) and a new classification of shared worker that un-
bundles the rights and responsibilities of employment (Oranburg 2018). 
Further research is needed to investigate the specifics of how a portable 
benefits regime can be implemented for workers in the new economy.
5. CONCLUSION
In the spring 1988 special issue of the Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization celebrating 50 years of Coase’s “Nature of the Firm,” 
Rosen (1999, p. 53) posits that if factors such as monitoring costs, joint 
production, or transport costs did not exist, then it would be “difficult 
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to imagine why complete decentralization of labor markets would fail 
to achieve efficient allocations. Most workers would be, in some sense, 
self-employed.” Thirty years after that publication, are we beginning 
to see the onset of just that type of decentralized world created by the 
broader reduction in transactions costs due to technological change? 
While firms may not completely dissipate, they may shrink, and there 
may be a general shift away from staffing up and toward contracting out 
as technology continues to reduce transaction costs.
We do not claim that technological change will cause traditional em-
ployment to dissipate completely, as there are a number of countervailing 
factors. Of course, there are also factors beyond transaction costs that 
would encourage firms to contract out instead of staff up.8 Epstein in par-
ticular has extensively elaborated on the regulatory costs of employment. 
Use of the state regulatory apparatus to cause a wealth transfer from em-
ployers to employees, Epstein argues, will inevitably fail because private 
actors will prefer to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, the legal risks 
associated with terminating an employee, the mandatory benefits that 
must be provided to employees, and the statutory rights of employees 
to collectively bargain are all costs that firms must bear when they staff 
up instead of contracting out. The decision to contract out may thus be 
understood as a type of regulatory arbitrage in which it pays to avoid 
the state’s regulatory apparatus. To the extent that regulatory arbitrage 
is more efficient for private actors than compliance with the regulation, 
private actors will do otherwise than comply.
The rise of the gig and freelance economy has some drawbacks as well. 
Epstein once argued that the mechanisms in contract-at-will employment 
are self-enforcing and thus labor law is not necessary because “[g]etting 
a new employee is difficult, as is finding a job, so that both parties have 
an incentive to preserve the relationship” (Epstein 2015a, p. 795). This 
argument is less true today than when he wrote those words. The gig 
economy has made both getting a new employee and finding a new job 
easier. As a result, parties have fewer incentives to preserve their relation-
ship now than previously. Indeed, employers are struggling with employ-
ees ghosting, in which they simply fail to show up for work, never to be 
heard from again. Moreover, the cost of getting a worker or finding a job 
is likely to continue to decline as the gig economy grows, while the em-
ployment market may become more anonymous. Therefore, to the extent 
8. For example, there are sociological factors such as changing attitudes toward the 
nature of work with the rise of the creative class (Florida 2012).
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that we found comfort in informal constraints on employers’ and work-
ers’ behavior when imposing labor regulations on the traditional econ-
omy, our comfort level may decline as transaction costs decline and lead 
to more gig work.
Nevertheless, the implications for the law is that formerly alternative 
forms of work may soon predominate in the labor market, and labor laws 
written in the 1930s may be outdated and inapplicable to the new type of 
jobs that are emerging today. As innovation disrupts goods and services 
as well as labor markets, it may also exert pressure to disrupt age-old la-
bor regulations and reform them for a new economy.
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